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Re: PC: PC Institutional Creditors Group
- Subject: Re: PC: PC Institutional Creditors Group
- From: "James Reaves" <jereaves@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2005 23:01:11 -0400
Thanks for the information about PC's financing and the excellent way you
presented it. One of the things that fascinates me about Penn Central (and
railroad) history are the details that go far beyond the equipment and
running trains (although they're cool, too!).
>From: "Robert Holzweiss" <robert.holzweiss -AT- nara.gov>
>Reply-To: penn-central -AT- smellycat.com
>To: <gary -AT- mssinc.com>, <firstname.lastname@example.org>
>Subject: Re: PC: PC Institutional Creditors Group
>Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2005 13:17:54 -0400
>Gary and listers
>Although I do not have the actual document in front of me (it is at home),
>I am almost certain your question concerns the banks that participated in
>the PC's revolving credit line established by David Bevan as a last ditch
>financing solution to keep the railroad afloat. After exhausting his
>borrowing options ($100,000,000 in commercial paper during 1968/1969,
>borrowing $59,000,000 from European banks, and using PC's Pennco subsidiary
>to issue $50,000,000 of 8.25% bonds) Bevan negotiated a $50,000,000
>revolving credit line with 71 banks led by First National City Bank (FNCB)
>of New York.
>After exhausting the initial $50,000,000, Bevan arranged to increase the
>credit line to $300,000,000 with FNCB of N.Y.'s stake increasing to
>$35,000,000. As collateral, Bevan pledged Pennco, the Penn Central's last
>unencumbered asset, valued at more than $900,000,000. The revolving credit
>line acted like a credit card with a $300,000,000 line of credit. Of
>course, Bevan planned on repaying the money to reduce interest payments but
>the PC's financial trouble precluded repayment and Bevan exhausted the
>$300,000,000. The PC was then saddled with huge interest payments without
>the means to repay interest or principle.
>In hindsight, it appears that David Bevan managed the Penn Central's
>finances so poorly that his extravagant borrowing with little hope of
>repaying caused the railroad to fail. However, Bevan was no fool. He,
>like many Nixon Administration officials including Arthur Burns (Council of
>Economic Advisors), Bevan believed the Penn Central would eventually turn
>the corner toward profitability. Therefore, he rested his financing
>strategy on four basic assumptions.
>First, he believed that tight money markets and high interest rates during
>1969 and 1970 would not last indefinitely, allowing him to refinance loans
>at lower rates of interest.
>Second, Bevan, like Saunders, Perlman, and most of the Penn Central
>management team, expected merger savings to increase over time as they
>fully integrated the PRR, NYC, and NH into one railroad.
>Third, as early as the 1950's, Bevan argued that long-term debt maturities
>represented the biggest threat to the PRR (and later the PC). While
>working for the PRR, he spread out long-term debt maturities to reduce the
>threat of too many maturities in any given year. When Bevan assumed his
>position as chief financial officer with the PC, he again faced uneven debt
>maturities because of the uneven long-term obligations of the PC's three
>predecessor lines. The rapid maturation of significant long-term debt
>forced Bevan to refinance with short-term loans until he could retire the
>debt with merger savings or increased revenue from the Penn Central's
>non-railroad subsidiaries. In retrospect, refinancing long-term
>obligations with short-term debt may seem foolish, however, Bevan only
>followed the prevailing wisdom of the day. Even Section 77 of the
>Bankruptcy Act assumed a railroad in bankruptcy protection only required
>relief from long-term debt obligations to return to solve!
> nt operations. Bevan's strategy hinged on postponing long-term debt
>repayment without entering bankruptcy protection by refinancing with
>short-term notes such as commercial paper. Because his plan depended on
>rapid increase in revenue, it carried a high degree of risk. Although his
>refinancing strategy allowed extra time for the railroad to turn the
>corner, the revenue never materialized, forcing the PC into bankruptcy.
>Finally, Bevan, like the rest of the PC management team, optimistically
>hoped that the railroad's financial trouble might lead to higher rates or
>regulatory reform. When rate increases proved inadequate, regulatory
>reform failed to develop, the tight money market failed to loosen, merger
>savings failed to materialize, and short-term debt obligations began to
>mature, Bevan found himself accepting the blame for the Penn Central's
>dismal financial condition.
>These are my opinions based on my research. Other views/critiques are
> >>> gary -AT- mssinc.com 06/23/05 10:01AM >>>
>OK gang, here's a real tester. Does anyone know anything about the Penn
>Central Institiutional Creditors Group? From what I can gather, it has
>something to do with the PC Corp. transferring rail assets to Conrail. Any
>information would be appreciated...
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